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JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
Fernandez v. Wilkinson: Making the United
States Accountable Under Customary
International Law
"We speculate that this opinion has the potential to affect, in addi-
tion to the petitioner, only a small subset of aliens consisting of the other
approximately 230 Cuban nationals detained at Leavenworth as well as
the nearly 1800 Cubans held in federal prisons across the country."'
United States District Judge Richard D. Rogers humbly shouldered this
limitation on the decision in Fernandez v. Wilkinson,2 but under the
proper circumstances it may provide a basis for the application of cus-
tomary international law in the United States courts to litigation in many
areas, especially human rights and habeas corpus.
Pedro Rodriguez Fernandez (Rodriguez) arrived in the United States
in early June 1980, one of approximately 130,000 Cuban refugees to land
during that year's mass immigration, seeking admission into this country.
In the course of his entry proceedings he revealed that he had had crimi-
nal convictions in Cuba,8 and that he had in fact been released to come to
the United States directly from prison. Under immigration rules, this re-
cord made him "excludable" at the border, but Cuba did not respond to
diplomatic efforts to return him. As a result, he was detained at the
United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, indefinitely to await
an apparently not forthcoming deportation. The Fernandez v. Wilkinson
decision was rendered in habeas corpus proceedings brought against the
Leavenworth Penitentiary warden.
The court was particularly impressed by the fact that Rodriguez was
detained in a more restrictive area and given fewer privileges than the
general inmate population at Leavenworth; but the element of arbitrary
detention was the factor critical to the outcome. A specific finding was
made that "extended, indefinite confinement in a federal prison [was]
deleterious to the personal integrity of petitioner and [could] only be
viewed as arbitrary detention."' The detention thus was unauthorized
by law and an abuse of the discretion of the Attorney General and his
delegates.'
1. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 800 (D. Kan. 1980), appeal docketed, No.
81-1238 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 1981).
2. 505 F. Supp. 787.
3. The crimes were two thefts of suitcases, in 1959 and 1964, and an attempted bur-
glary. Rodriguez had been sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment for these, plus a pen-
alty of three years for an escape. These offenses fit into the class of crimes of "moral turpi-
tude" rendering an alien visa applicant excludable. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(9) (1976). 505 F. Supp.
at 789. It appeared to the district court that he might already be eligible for release had he
remained in Cuba. Id. at 791-92. No charge was ever made against Rodriguez within the
United States.
4. Id. at 791.
5. Id. at 792.
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In cases where aliens are excludable at the border, the relevant appli-
cable rules6 are similar to those used in deportation proceedings concern-
ing persons earlier admitted into the country:7 provision is made for mini-
mal hearings and challenge to the Attorney General on the ground of
abuse of discretion.8 It is possible under each category to parole, or "con-
ditionally release," the alien after he is found to be deportable.9 The regu-
lar deportation proceedings contain two safeguards, absent from exclusion
proceedings, to which the Fernandez court attached great significance.
First, the regular deportation statute permits the Attorney General to
contact alternative countries if that country from which the alien arrived
in the United States refuses to take him back. The exclusion statute con-
tains no such option, because usually an alien is screened for admissibility
before he leaves his home for the United States, with the result that
"alien convicts are normally disallowed entry to this country when they
go through pre-processing prior to departing their home land."10 Thus the
Cuban refugees' situation was "unique in United States history,"" for
they could not be returned to Cuba without that nation's acceptance, and
no other recipient could be discovered.
1 2
Second, the deportation statute contains a time limit beyond which
the alien's detention is "automatically terminated."'' That limit is six
months, when the alien is to be released "if deportation has not been
practicable, advisable, or possible, or departure of the alien from the
United States under the order of deportation has not been effected,""
although such release is made subject to the supervision of the Attorney
General. The only reference made by the exclusion statute to timing is
the provision that the excludable alien's deportation be concluded "im-
mediately.' 5 Rodriguez' imprisonment had lasted beyond six months at
the time of this decision.
The detention referred to in this discussion is only that which is "for
the sole purpose of effecting deportation."'" If deportation is not realiza-
6. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1976).
7. Id. § 1252.
8. Id. §§ 1105(a), 1226(b).
9. For deportable immigrants, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(a)(3), (d); for excludable aliens, 8
U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). The tragedy that could result where an alien was held indefinitely
before parole was possible is exemplified in Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
10. 505 F. Supp. at 792.
11. Testimony of Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS] District Director,
George W. Geil, in hearing on another (unspecified) Cuban detainee's habeas corpus case.
Id.
12. In effect the INS was stuck with Pedro Rodriguez and the others. It was granted by
the court that the situation was likely occasioned by an innocent failure of the authorities to
adjust timely immigration procedures to meet the challenge of the mass immigration. Id. at
792, 794, 799.
13. Id. at 793. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(c).
14. Id.
15. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a).
16. 505 F. Supp. at 793, citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896);
1981
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ble within the time limit, the "continued detention of the alien [is] with-
out cause."" In cases where the alien is determined to be a security risk,
or when he has been charged or convicted in accordance with United
States law and procedure, it is possible that he might legally be detained
past the statutory limit. The Fernandez court declared, however, that
"indeterminate detention in a maximum security prison of excluded
aliens who have not been convicted of a crime in this country or found to
be a security risk is arbitrary and every bit as objectionable as indefinite
detention of deportable aliens."18
The most peculiar difference to be found between the treatment of
excluded aliens and those who have been admitted into the United
States, later to become deportable, is the "time-honored legal fiction" ac-
cording to which certain excludable and excluded aliens "are not recog-
nized under the law as having entered our borders. Consequently, these
nonentrants customarily have not enjoyed the panoply of rights guaran-
teed to citizens and alien entrants by our Constitution."' In the absence
of argument against this precedent in the Fernandez proceedings, the
court reaffirmed its legitimacy,20 at the same time setting the basis for an
unprecedented constitutional ruling.
On the authority of the legal fiction 'of nonentry, the court rejected
the petitioner's claim that his detention violated the Eighth Amendment
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.2' It summarized these holdings and the breadth of the re-
sulting problem in this fashion:
We have declared that indeterminate detention of petitioner in a
maximum security prison pending unforeseeable deportation consti-
tutes arbitrary detention. Due to the unique legal status of excluded
aliens in this country, it is an evil from which our Constitution and
statutory laws afford no protection. Our domestic laws are designed to
deter private individuals from harming one another and to protect in-
dividuals from abuse by the State. But in the case of unadmitted
aliens detained on our soil, but legally deemed to be outside our bor-
ders, the machinery of domestic law utterly fails to operate to assure
protection.
2 2
Unable to find relief under domestic law, the court then sought to deter-
Kusman v. District Director of Immigration, 117 F. Supp. 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
17. 505 F. Supp. at 793. See also Ross v. Wallis, 279 F. 401 (2d Cir. 1922); Kusman, 117
F. Supp. 541.
18. 505 F. Supp. at 794.
19. Id. at 790. As authority for the constitutionality of this denial of rights, the court
cites, inter alia, Fiallo v. Beal, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976);
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596
n.5 (1953), citing Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring);
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
20. 505 F. Supp. at 790.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 975.
VOL. 10:360
DEVELOPMENTS
mine whether relief was available under international law.
An amicus curiae brief filed by Kansas Legal Services was credited
with raising the argument adopted by the court that "international law
secures to petitioner the right to be free of arbitrary detention and that
his right is being violated."' 8 The amicus brief cited two multilateral in-
struments: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"4 and the Ameri-
can Convention on Human Rights,2 5 the latter signed by President Carter
in 1977. The court responded favorably, reciting the provisions on arbi-
trary detention, and brought into the discussion two more documents, the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms" and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,17 quoting from the latter at length in the text of the opinion.28
The court noted that since the United States is not a ratifying party to
the American Convention, the European Convention, or the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the present petitioner had alleged no direct
violation of a binding treaty obligation." But there remains the impor-
tant effect given by internal United States law to international law, both
by constitutional mandate and by governmental policy.
Illustrating the Carter Administration's attitude toward arbitrary de-
tention within the context of the United States' international obligations,
the court quoted Patricia M. Derian, President Carter's Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs: "Our human
rights concerns embrace those internationally recognized rights found in
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. The specific focus of
our policy is to seek greater observance by all governments of the rights
of the person including. . . freedom from arbitrary detention." 0 And for
23. Id.
24. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217 A
(III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
25. American Convention on Human Rights, done at San Jose, Nov. 22, 1969, entered
into force July 18, 1978, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. LJV/
11.23 doc. 21, rev. 6, (1979); reprinted in 9 Ir'L LEGAL MAT. 673 (1970).
26. Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at
Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, [1950] Europ. T.S. No. 5 (1968), 213
U.N.T.S. 221.
27. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No.
16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 168 (1967).
28. 505 F. Supp. at 797.
29. Id. at 795. The court recognized the binding obligation of the United States under
the United Nations Charter. Id. at 796. See generally Rogoff, The International Legal Obli-
gations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty, 32 MmINE L. REV. 263 (1980). On the chang-
ing nature of the acceptance under international law of the human rights of individuals, see
generally Ferguson, International Human Rights, 1980 L. FORUM 681 (1980); Higgins, Con-
ceptual Thinking About the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 11
(1978); Nanda, From Gandhi to Gandhi-International Legal Responses to the Destruction
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in India, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 19
(1976); Note, Detention Without Trial in Kenya, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 441 (1978).
30. 505 F. Supp. at 798, quoting Derian, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy-The
1981
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expression of Congress' recognition of the same commitment, it quoted
Congressman Donald M. Frasier, former Chairman of the Subcommittee
on International Organizations and the Commission on International Re-
lations, House of Representatives:
Generally [Congress has] said the military aid should be reduced or
terminated to a country guilty of a consistent pattern of gross viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights. We define gross vio-
lations as those involving the integrity of the person: torture, pro-
longed detention without charges or trial, and other cruel and
inhuman treatment. 1
The court continued, borrowing from the recent decision in Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala,"2 two citations from which set forth the traditional inter-
pretation of constitutional references to international law as part of the
law of the United States. The Filartiga court cited Justice Marshall's
1815 statement that absent congressional enactment,
United States courts are 'bound by the law of nations, which is a part
of the law of the land.' These words were echoed in The Paquete Ha-
bana [1900]: '[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate juris-
diction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination.'"8
An important, insightful rule stated in Filartiga as a basis for deter-
mination of customary international law was applied without modifica-
tion to bring together all of the various authorities cited by the Fernan-
dez court:u
Principles of customary international law may be discerned from
an overview of express international conventions, the teachings of le-
gal scholars, the general custom and practice of nations and relevant
judicial decisions. [Citation omitted.] When, from this overview a
wrong is found to be of mutual, and not merely several, concern
Executive Perspective, [1978] INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS L. & PRAc. 183. For an insightful ap-
praisal of the United States' human rights policy under the Carter administration, see
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS 3-91 (V. Nanda, J. Scarritt, & G. Shepherd eds. 1981).
31. 505 F. Supp. at 797-98, quoting from Frasier, Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Pol-
icy-The Congressional Perspective, [1978] INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS L. & PRAc. 171, 178.
32. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See Development, Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: Providing
Federal Jurisdiction for Human Rights Violations through the Alien Tort Statute, 10 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 355 (1981).
33. 630 F.2d at 887. The Court relied on The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 422
(1815), and The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), for these principles.
34. In addition to those mentioned supra in notes 22-25, 28-34, the court relied on:
Arbitration Matter of France ex rel Madame Julien Chevreau, M.S. Dep't of State, file no.
500, AIA11197, quoted in 1 M. WHITEMAN, DAMAGES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 440-63 (1937);
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Order of 29
January 1971, [1971] I.C.J. 12, 76 (separate opinion of Vice President Ammoun); Bilder,
The Status of International Human Rights Law: An Overview, [1978] INT'L L. & PRAc. 1, 8;
Stotzky, Book Review, 11 MIAMI J. INT'L L. 229 (1979).
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among nations, it may be termed an international law violation."
Determining that the presence of rules against arbitrary detention in the
cited international instruments indicates this mutual concern, and distil-
ling from these and other sources a consensus of international law on ar-
bitrary detention according to the rule in Filartiga, the court declared
that there was an international law violation in the treatment of Rodri-
guez. Applying this rule to the situation presented, the court concluded
that "even though the indeterminate detention of an excluded alien can-
not be said to violate the United States Constitution or our statutory
laws, it is judicially [remediable] as a violation of international law. ' ' "
The final ruling was an order that the respondent terminate the arbi-
trary detention of the petitioner within ninety days, by deportation, re-
lease on parole, determination of security threat or likelihood of abscond-
ing, or transfer to a refugee camp; if termination according to one of these
or another reasonable alternative was not effected within the prescribed
time, the court would grant the writ of habeas corpus and release Rodri-
guez on parole.
87
The effect of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala was to grant foreign nationals a
United States forum for the vindication of violations of international law,
specifically in contravention of the law against torture." The unanswered
question is how that decision will affect violations of other, similarly well-
established rules of international law. The decision in Fernandez v. Wil-
kinson has made a logical application of the rule: the United States, too,
is bound by customary international law and will be held to the accordant
standard of conduct by its own courts.
The limitation inherent in the facts of this case cannot be disre-
garded, for had Rodriguez been a United States resident there would
have been no question of his eligibility for habeas corpus relief under the
Constitution. By the strength of the authority and reasoning mustered by
the court in support of its conclusion, however, this decision could sur-
pass that limitation. In essence, the court said that where there exists a
shortfall in constitutional protection to the disadvantage of any individ-
ual within United States territory, if there is adequate protection under
customary international law the court will apply the customary rule. The
question arises, then, what will be the reaction of courts if domestic
law-constitutional or general, statutory or common-is challenged as
falling short of a principle of international law. It is submitted that a
strong case may be made under Fernandez for the supremacy of custom-
ary international law.
Katharine J. Kunz
35. 505 F. Supp. at 798, citing Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876 (1980).
36. 505 F. Supp. at 798.
37. Id. at 800.
38. Note 32 supra.
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